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Abstract—Zcash is a privacy-preserving cryptocurrency that
provides anonymous monetary transactions. While Zcash’s
anonymity is part of a rigorous scientific discussion, information
on the underlying peer-to-peer network are missing. In this paper,
we provide the first long-term measurement study of the Zcash
network to capture key metrics such as the network size and
node distribution as well as deeper insights on the centralization
of the network. Furthermore, we present an inference method
based on a timing analysis of block arrivals that we use to
determine interconnections of nodes. We evaluate and verify
our method through simulations and real-world experiments,
yielding a precision of 50 % with a recall of 82 % in the
real-world scenario. By adjusting the parameters, the topology
inference model is adaptable to the conditions found in other
cryptocurrencies and therefore also contributes to the broader
discussion of topology hiding in general.
Index Terms—Zcash, blockchain, P2P, topology inference
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Bitcoin’s [1] introduction in 2008, a large number
of so-called altcoins emerged. Altcoins are inspired by the
general principle of a distributed ledger, but aim to improve
the system design in one way or another. One of these altcoins
is the Zcash project, which implements the Zerocash payment
scheme [2]. Zcash launched in October 2016 and aims to
enable anonymous, yet publicly verifiable, transactions by
employing zero-knowledge proofs [3].
To date, most research on Zcash concentrates on anonymity
and security aspects of the ledger [4, 5]. Another central
aspect of the system, however, has not yet been considered
in prior investigations: the Zcash peer-to-peer network. This
is particularly notable, since it has been shown before that
the properties of the networking layer may have serious
consequences on the security and privacy of blockchain-based
systems [6, 7]. Moreover, revealing the network topology
may render even the best privacy-preserving cryptographic
primitives ineffective, if it is possible to link transactions and
blocks to specific peers [8, 9]. On a general note, monitoring
the network status and health can indicate arising issues, such
as a high degree of mining power centralization. This sort of
centralization can be considered critical as it puts the majority
of computational resources in the hands of a single entity,
which could empower a malicious actor to rig the consensus
in her favor. Centralization in general undermines the goal of
distributed trust since the payment history could be altered at
any time [1].
In this paper, we provide the first longitudinal measurement
study of the Zcash peer-to-peer network and present a model
for topology inference. In our measurement study, we expose
information about Zcash nodes and their connectivity. To this
end, we observed the Zcash peer-to-peer network from a
vantage point over a period of four month (July to October
2018), covering multiple major client and protocol updates.1
The vantage point is a deployed reference client, modified for
data collection. The empirical data allows us to conduct a
global analysis of the Zcash network, capturing key metrics
such as network size, block propagation behavior and timing,
mining power distribution, and node churn. We also use
the data to reveal information about the nodes themselves,
including client version and global node distribution.
Based on the measured data of the Zcash network and pre-
vious ideas for topology inference in the Bitcoin network [10],
we developed a passive topology inference method which ex-
ploits the block relay mechanism. While our method allows us
to infer connections of mining nodes and their direct neighbors
only, it otherwise has a number of advantages: It is inde-
pendent of countermeasures for active timing analyses based
on transactions, such as trickling or diffusion spreading [9].
Additionally, the usage of blocks as a basis for inference
produces no costs in terms of transaction fees. We verify our
model in a simulation using the Boost Graph Library [11]
and present various ways to determine the parameters of our
model. Moreover, we test the approach in a series of real-world
experiments with two Zcash network nodes. In this scenario,
the model could achieve a precision of 50 % and a recall
of 82 %, proving its applicability in a real-world setting. In
general, we were able to reproduce and improve the results
of [10]. As the topology inference model is adaptable to the
protocol specifications of other cryptocurrencies, it contributes
to the discussion of topology hiding in general.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
shows similar research concerning characterization and topol-
ogy inference of cryptocurrencies. Section III presents our
research of the Zcash peer-to-peer network. In Section IV, we
introduce our inference model which is evaluated in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper.
1The measurement data and simulation code base is publically available at
https://gitlab.tubit.tu-berlin.de/erik 1105/map-z data
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II. RELATED WORK
So far, most research in the field of cryptocurrencies con-
centrates on Bitcoin and Ethereum: prior contributions [12, 13,
14] explored both networks and collected statistical data by
deploying measurement nodes. Among others, they observed
that the block propagation delay has a significant impact on the
security and fairness of the consensus layer. This has also been
studied analytically and with the help of simulations [6, 7].
In [15], the degree of centralization of Bitcoin and Ethereum
is investigated. The authors found both networks to be highly
centralized in terms of (geographical) mining power distribu-
tion. As also shown in [16], the mining power distribution
is dominated by Chinese mining pools, which bears the
risk of intervention by a state actor. Moreover, the authors
argue that the interference of the so-called “Great Firewall of
China” leads to degraded block propagation performance in
the Bitcoin network.
Beyond Bitcoin and Ethereum, Zcash exhibits similar prop-
erties to Bitcoin but provides additional privacy guarantees
by implementing so-called shielded transactions, which use
zero-knowledge proofs [3] to yield anonymous transactions.
Most prior work on Zcash focuses on the anonymity aspects.
In [4], the authors studied the effectiveness of the anonymity
features in Zcash by analyzing the shielded function usage
patterns. Similarly, the authors of [5] analyzed the data stored
in the Zcash blockchain to evaluate its anonymity. However,
to the best of our knowledge, no previous work studied the
network behavior of Zcash. Our work therefore provides the
first measurement study concentrating on Zcash’s peer-to-peer
networking layer.
Network tomography in general comprises methods to infer
internal network characteristics, including topology inference.
The methods basically differ in the employed type of probing
technique, which boils down to either unicast or multicast
measurements. While unicast measurements, such as sandwich
probes [17] or RTT measurements [18], are hard to realize
in Zcash, as the observer cannot determine the spreading
path, multicast measurements are easier to reproduce. Most
approaches using multicast measurements, e.g., [19], use end-
to-end loss instead of delay, though. Since loss rates can only
be measured between two peers, these approaches are not
applicable in Zcash as well.
There exists research that concentrates on topology infer-
ence of cryptocurrencies: Miller et al. [20] use the timestamps
of announced IP addresses to infer links between different
nodes and also try to find mining pools and influential nodes.
Another approach by Grundmann et al. is primarily used to
expose only a few targeted nodes. The approach uses a method
to detect the topology of Bitcoin by exploiting its transaction
propagation mechanics [21].
In [10], Neudecker et al. present a method to infer the
topology of a peer-to-peer flooding network like Bitcoin with
the help of an analytical model. The authors list in [22]
topology hiding as a security requirement for blockchain
networks and present an adversary model which tries to
infer the topology based on the peer discovery mechanism.
Furthermore, they show the importance of the transaction relay
delay as a countermeasure against topology inference. The
ideas of both papers serve as the basis for the conducted
topology inference. In this paper, our inference model however
extends the approach by employing a passive, cost-efficient
monitoring, and more accurate approach, promising to capture
the whole network.
III. MAPPING THE ZCASH NETWORK
In this section, we present results of our measurement study
of the Zcash network. The goal of this investigation is to
illuminate network characteristics on a global scale. To this
end, the empirical data covers two main categories: data about
individual nodes and about information propagation between
nodes. In particular, we show the worldwide interest in Zcash
and present insights on network size and stability, geographic
node distribution, software deployment and lifecycles, origin
of blocks, block propagation time, as well as mining central-
ization.
A. Measurement Setup
In order to characterize the Zcash network, we deployed
a Zcash reference client for data collection as an observation
point. The client was run on a virtual machine in our university
network (TU Berlin, IPv4). However, minor client modifica-
tions were necessary to ensure a reliable measurement setup
that avoids unwanted side-effects and yields representative
results. For example, in order to get a comprehensive overview,
it is necessary that the observation point is connected to as
many peers as possible. We therefore increased the maximum
number of outbound connections and allowed for 873 simul-
taneous connections, which is the upper limit provided by the
reference client on a Linux machine. Moreover, we disabled
the sending of block inventory messages that announce new
blocks to peers. We however recorded arrival times of block
inventory messages from neighboring peers to get an overview
of the block propagation times in the network. Additionally,
we recorded information about connected peers and the mining
difficulty. In our measurements, we omitted all data points
recorded during the initial blockchain download, because this
is a one-time phase and therefore does not represent normal
operation. The described methodology is on par with other
measurement studies [23].
We recorded data snapshots about peers and blocks every
five minutes and two minutes, respectively. While a time
interval of two minutes does not guarantee to record every
single block, it should capture the vast majority of blocks2.
In addition to the application layer data, we sent ICMP ping
messages to the connected peers, which serve as a baseline and
help to reveal networking problems during the measurements.
Our measurement period spans from July 2, 2018 until
November 12, 2018. It thus captures the time after Zcash’s
first network upgrade called “Overwinter” [24]. During the
2At the time of writing, Zcash’s block interval time is 2.5 minutes
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Fig. 1: Distribution of announced version strings in the Zcash peer-to-peer network.
measurements, we upgraded the client twice to include new
functionalities and to ensure compatibility after Zcash’s second
network upgrade called “Sapling” [24]. Accordingly, client
versions MagicBean 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 2.0.0 were utilized.
B. Measurement Results
Network size and client versions: To begin with, we are
interested in the network size and the number of nodes running
a specific software version. In order to estimate these numbers,
we count the number of network peers that were connected to
our measurement node over time.
The number of simultaneous connections held by our van-
tage point and the distribution of client versions are shown in
Fig. 1. As the number of observed simultaneous connections
never exceeds this range, we estimate the size of the network
to be around 300 to 350 nodes. Note however that we observed
4,208 distinct IP addresses which established a connection to
our vantage point at least once. In total, the address manager
of our node learned from exchanged address information about
around 25,000 IP addresses. We assume that this high number
of (stale) IP addresses stems from a small number of network
peers that constantly change their IP address.
As a side note, on November 11, we observed 117 simul-
taneous connections coming from the same IP address. These
117 connections were open for approximately 30 minutes
but did not send any data. The version name of this client
was “xbadprobe”, which suggests that this may have been an
attempt to occupy the node’s inbound connections.
The reference client provided by the Zcash developer team
uses the string “MagicBean” followed by a version number
as the client name. While it is possible to modify the client
software without changing the announced version string, we
consider this a negligible side-effect and use the strings to
account for different client versions. Likewise, the data shows
that only a small fraction of clients use custom version strings
or minor versions. We therefore only consider major client
versions and categorize minor versions (e.g., 2.0.1-rc1) and
custom version strings as “other clients” in the following.
Since client version 1.0.9, each reference client comes
with an End-of-Support (EoS) period, which causes the client
software to halt after the EoS period has expired. At the
time of writing, the period is set to be 64,512 blocks or
approximately 16 weeks. Visually, we can clearly identify
the EoS periods in Fig. 1. For example, we captured the
complete 16 week lifecycle for client version 1.1.2, showing
the adoption of and transition to other versions. Moreover,
client versions older than 1.1.0 are no longer supported after
the second network upgrade. Connections to these outdated
clients are therefore dropped after the version handshake.
Nevertheless, our data reveals that some clients were still
active with older client versions, even though they no longer
supported the consensus. However, the client versions 1.1.0
and 1.1.1 included a configuration option which disabled the
automatic halt after the EoS period, which explains why the
observed drop in numbers for those versions is not as entire
as for version 1.1.2. The introduction of EoS periods is an
interesting and clearly effective approach to ensure that all
users update their client software and obsolete versions leave
the network in a timely manner. This reduces the threat that
bugs persist even after they were already fixed, which in turn
bears the danger to undermine the trust in the currency.
Geographical and mining distribution: In Fig. 2, we
show the country distribution of observed IP addresses and
block origins during our measurement period, which provides
insights on Zcash’s global adoption and mining power distri-
bution. We used GeoIP [25] to map the IP addresses from our
data set to countries. If a country had less than 30 IP addresses
it is grouped as “other”. We further assume that the host which
first announces the block is also the block’s miner.
We generally can see that the Zcash network spreads over all
northern continents. From a country perspective, the clients are
mainly present in Russia and the United States. From a conti-
nent perspective, however, the network is evenly distributed
over Europe, America, and Asia. Only a small number of
nodes are located in the southern continents.
In contrast, the mining power distribution clearly shows a
skewed distribution, suggesting an immense centralization of
mining power. We observe that around 51 % of the blocks
are created by 16 miners, out of which ten are located in
China. Overall, 53 % of all observed blocks originate from
China, 10 % from France, 9 % from the United States, 5 %
from Germany, and 4 % from the Netherlands. The remaining
19 % are from different countries. Notably, while we observed
only seven IP addresses from Ireland, the country contributes
3% of all blocks. It should also be mentioned that we found
some nodes that did not announce any blocks.
We also observed a quadruplication in the difficulty during
our measurements, resulting from an increased mining power,
which effectively raises the bar to start mining blocks in the
Zcash network. This increase in mining power hence makes
it unlikely that the country distribution of miners will change
in the near future. As new Equihash-capable ASIC mining
hardware was introduced in mid 2018, the increase in mining
power is likely a result of a gradual change from GPU mining
to ASIC mining.
In general, geographical centralization of mining power in
one jurisdictional area creates the risk of interference by a
state actor. The centralization of mining power in China we
observed is in line with results from other cryptocurrencies,
e.g., Bitcoin [16].
Block propagation: In order to determine the time it takes
for a block to propagate in the network, we measured the time
it takes until a block is announced by all neighbors of our
vantage point. Fig. 3 accordingly shows the time differences
as a mass function of the first and all following observed block
announcements (i.e., arrival of block inventory messages).
In order to estimate when the neighbor peers learned about
the blocks, the shown times are adjusted by subtracting half
RTT retrieved from Zcash’s keep-alive messages. The RTT
is estimated using the exponential weighted moving average
(EWMA) approach known from TCP (cf. RFC 6298).
We note that block propagation follows a long-tailed distri-
bution, where a considerable number of inventory messages
take significantly longer. After 690 ms, 50 % of all block
inventory messages have arrived. And after two seconds, 90 %
of all nodes know the block. Furthermore, it takes a small
number of nodes a really long time to retrieve and propagate
new blocks. Interestingly, this is in accordance with similar
observations (≈ 2 s for 90 % coverage) made in [23] for the
Bitcoin network, even though the latter is considerably larger
(at the time of this paper: ≈ 350 vs. ≈ 10.000 nodes).
In general, we can say the network needs around 700 ms for
a block to be known by most peers and roughly two seconds
to spread the information in the whole network. However, this
delay does not seem to have a significant negative impact on
consensus. From the 57,365 observed block hashes, only 297
are not included in the Zcash blockchain, yielding a stale block
rate of 0.337 %. This measurement is comparable to the stale
rates found in other cryptocurrency networks like Bitcoin or
Litecoin, which according to [7] exhibited around 0.41 % and
0.273 % stale blocks, respectively.
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Fig. 2: Distribution of observed addresses and block origins.
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Fig. 4: Latencies of the connected clients.
Network stability: Lastly, we are interested in the network
load and stability. Fig. 4 shows the median latencies to all
connected nodes over time. As a baseline, we additionally
measured ICMP ping times and compare them to the Zcash
ping measurements. The Zcash ping is a keep-alive message,
scheduled every two minutes, which is send to all neighbors
via the respective TCP connection and is usually processed
with all other exchanged messages. This leads to head-of-
line blocking during transaction and block relay, whereby the
Zcash ping messages are delayed. In comparison to the more
reliable ICMP ping, it therefore rather serves as an indicator
of a node’s activity.
The ICMP ping’s median values vary between 45 ms and
55 ms and are lower and less fluctuating than Zcash pings.
From October 18, the median ICMP ping and Zcash ping
latencies increased. This behavior could be a reaction to the
second upgrade (“Sapling”). In this upgrade, the performance
of the so-called shielded transactions was improved, which
might have made them more attractive and could have lead to
increased usage. The increase of the ICMP ping could also be
due to network interferences in the University network.
As in any other open peer-to-peer network, nodes in the
Zcash network can join and leave at any time, which results
in an ever-changing topology. In order to assess the network
stability, we analyzed the lifetime of connections. In order to
circumvent artificial spikes in our data set stemming from our
own client updates, we only consider the time after we updated
our measurement node to client version 2.0.0.
We generally observed that around 50 % of connections
remained active for at least 50 minutes. Moreover, around
20 % of connections lasted longer than a day, while 10 % were
active for more than four days, and 1 % have even remained
active since the beginning of our study. We also observed
around 24 % of short-lived connections, which were active less
than five minutes. In summary, we could see that a good part
of the network consists of long-lived stable peers. This core
network can certainly become a reasonable target for topology
inference.
IV. TOPOLOGY INFERENCE
In the following, we aim to infer the interconnectivity of
Zcash network peers by conducting a passive timing analysis,
which allows us to incrementally uncover the topology of
the peer-to-peer network. To this end, we build upon and
extend the inference model developed by Neudecker et al. [10,
22]. We however replace the employed active transaction
measurements with passive block measurements, which, as we
will see, has a number of advantages. In a nutshell, the goal is
to infer the connection between two peers by monitoring when
they emit inventory messages announcing new blocks. The
model concentrates on detecting connections between peers
adjacent to mining nodes, which can be used to reveal security-
critical information of the network.
A. Inference Model
Let us assume a source node S, which we consider the
origin of a block, and a relay node R. Moreover, assume that
node S and R are both interconnected and also connected to
a measurement node M .
A schematic of this three-node scenario is shown in Fig. 5.
While numbered arrows indicate the order and direction in
which messages are sent, dashed arrows indicate further pro-
tocol messages that are however only shown for completeness,
but do not influence the inference model. Hence, a block relay
in Zcash consists of a three-way message exchange (announce,
request, response): An inventory message announces a
block, a getdata message requests the block, and a block
message transmits the actual block data.
From the perspective of M , we have knowledge about the
time node S and R announced a specific block to node M . We
also know the round-trip times RTTMS and RTTMR between
nodes M and S, as well as nodes M and R, respectively. The
measured arrival times consist of at least a delay introduced by
the latency between S and R and the processing delay of R.
Since the measurements are conducted on M , the measured
time includes RTTMS/2 as well as RTTMR/2, which we
subtract once prior to the following calculations. Note that if
the latency difference is “small enough”, S and R are directly
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Fig. 5: Block propagation with three nodes.
connected with a high probability. We take this as the basis
for our timing analysis. In the following, we will derive our
model in detail.
When we assume that the link latency between any two
peers follows the same distribution λ and a node’s processing
delay can be described as d, then the probability of a time
difference t with h edges in between the two reference nodes
is given by
P (∆ = t|H = h) = (λ∗h ∗ d∗h)(t). (1)
Please note that the ∗-operator denotes a convolution; accord-
ingly, λ∗h and d∗h denote the h convolution power. To infer
the topology, we have to calculate the probability of h edges
assuming a time difference t. This is possible using Bayes’
Theorem,
P (H = h|∆ = t) = P (∆ = t|H = h) · P (H = h)
P (∆ = t)
. (2)
The probability that an inventory message arrives after
time t, P (∆ = t), can be calculated according to the law
of total probability. The probability P (∆ = t|H = h) is given
by (1). The probability of h edges between the two reference
nodes, P (H = h), can be calculated by assuming an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graph model, where the probability of an edge
is calculated based on the mean degree. In the case of a mean
degree deg and N nodes, the equation is given by
P (H = h) =
[
1−
(
deg
N − 1
)]h−1
·
(
deg
N − 1
)
. (3)
For our model, we assume that the link latency distribution λ
is a result of the three-way message exchange to relay a block.
Furthermore, we assume that this latency distribution follows a
normal distribution, i.e., λ(x) = N (x;µλ, σ2λ). The expected
propagation time is presumed to depend on the geolocation
of S and R. While this is a very simplifying assumption
as latencies may depend on many factors, including AS
and peering relationships, country-based measurements are
already available and/or easier to obtain in decent quality. The
mean µλ and variance σ2λ values of the normal distribution
can accordingly be estimated by using RTT measurements for
the respective geolocations, multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to
mind three-way message exchange.
We define a node’s processing delay d as the sum of
transmission delay, queuing delay, and block verification time.
While the transmission delay can have a significant impact
for very large block sizes, we assume the block verification
time to be the dominating factor. We therefore assume the
network-based delays to be adequately captured by the link
latency and leave the development of an advanced transmission
model as an open question for future research. Furthermore,
we generally assume a linear correlation between the time
it takes to validate a new block and the number of included
transactions, i.e., the block size sb. However, since the network
peers run on equipment of varying power, the appropriate
validation factor is not necessarily a global constant. To
account for variations, we model the processing delay d as
a normal distribution, i.e., d(x) = N (x;µd, σ2d). The resulting
function is
P (t−  ≤ t ≤ t+ |H = h) =
∫ t+
t−
N (t;µ, σ2)dt (4)
with µ = h · (µλ + µd), σ2 = h · (σ2λ + σ2d). Here  is a
tolerance variable adjusting for the possibility of measurement
errors. Given the complexity of this model, the selection of
reasonable mean and variance values is important to reach an
adequate degree of accuracy.
B. Parametrization
The inference model requires a number of parameters which
have an impact on the accuracy of the resulting estimations.
These parameters include the normal distributions for the
latency λ and the processing delay d, as well as the value
for the tolerance variable .
For the latency distribution λ, different data sources are
possible. We consider the iPlane dataset [26], which pro-
vides publicly available data of global latency measurements,
as a viable data source. Admittedly, the data is somewhat
outdated but still fits the purpose. It consist of pairs of
globally distributed IP addresses and a corresponding RTT
value measured on a specific point in time. As an alternative
data source, we suggest to conduct ICMP ping measurements
from the observation points or to directly utilize the Zcash
ping measurements (cf. Fig. 4).
Values for the validation time can also be acquired through
different means. We consider the evaluation constant from [7]
as a reasonable estimation for µd. Unfortunately, in this case
we must make some assumptions on the variance. Alterna-
tively, µd and σ2d can be acquired experimentally, i.e., by
averaging the processing time of a local Zcash node. We
compare both approaches in our evaluation.
Varying the tolerance parameter  should generally have no
significant influence on the measurement results. However,
larger values for  increase the influence of the likelihood
P (t −  ≤ t ≤ t + |H = h) and therefore decrease the
influence of the prior probability P (H = h) on the posterior
probability.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate our inference model using two different ways:
through a simulation scenario and a real world measurement
test with two Zcash nodes.
A. Methodology
In order to facilitate the simulation-based evaluation sce-
nario, we created an undirected graph with a certain amount of
vertices utilizing the Boost Graph Library [11]. Every vertex
represents a Zcash networking node and creates 8 edges to
randomly selected vertices, representing the 8 outgoing con-
nections the reference client tries to establish. The mean degree
of the random topology is therefore 16. We assign a country
to each vertex and draw an according link latency value for
each edge from a normal distribution that was parametrized
with the iPlane data set [26]. As discussed before, we multiply
this latency value by factor 1.5 to mind the entire three-way
message exchange. Moreover, we simulate our vantage point
which is connected to all other vertices and therefore able to
observe the simulated propagation behavior in its entirety.
Given this network graph, we can deduce simulated time
difference measurements by traversing the shortest path be-
tween any node and our vantage point, accumulating the edge
weights accordingly. In order to retrieve statistically significant
results, we repeated this process 50 times for varying edge
weights and applied our topology inference model for each of
the measurements. Each time, we calculated the probability
under a tolerance of  = 5ms for possible hop counts h
of 1 to 9 and finally calculated the mean value for each
distance. From this, we deem the value with highest mean
probability as the likeliest estimated distance. As we are in full
knowledge of the simulated topology, this scenario allows us to
exactly determine the precision and recall of our model under
the influence of different parametrizations for the processing
time distribution d = N (x;µd, σ2d) and block sizes sb. The
validation constants kµ and kσ2 determine the distribution
parameters as µd = kµ · sb and σ2d = kσ2 · sb.
Theoretically, our model could predict the probability of
h up to the network diameter. However, our model becomes
less accurate for distances above three, since path lengths
larger than two exhibit an increased possibility for parallel
running paths. Therefore, our model is suited best to infer
individual connections one by one. Additionally, as our model
utilizes assumptions about the geographic locations of network
peers to determine their edge latencies, inaccuracies in the
geographic clustering can result in high amount of false
positives for certain peer connections. For example, if we
assume a scenario in which two nodes located in Germany are
connected via a third node located in Russia, our model could
predict a distance of five (low latency) edges, even though the
simulated path consists only of three (high latency) links.
In our simulation, we considered topologies with 300 nodes,
which resembles the measured network size. Furthermore, we
evaluate our model in the simulation for distances up to three.
For the geographic distribution, we chose two countries each
from America and Europe, and three countries from Asia,
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Fig. 6: Precision and Recall for different block sizes, different
variances and 300 nodes located in 7 different countries.
whereby we aim to represent the northern Hemisphere. The
distribution assigned as follows: 30 % United States, 20 %
in Russia, 10 % Canada, 10 % China, 10 % France, 10 %
Germany, and 10 % Japan.
B. Simulation Results
We use a simulation scenario to evaluate different
parametrizations of the processing time distribution d. That
is, we evaluated precision and recall of our model for dif-
ferent block sizes sb assuming the validation constants kµ =
0.3796µs/B and kσ2 = 0.552049µs2/B taken from [7]. We
also ran the simulations for three different degrees of latency
standard deviation: “small”, “medium” and “large”, assuming
10 %, 30 %, and 50 % of the mean, respectively.
The simulation results presented in Fig. 6 show that the
model generally performs better with larger block sizes, which
yield a precision of up to 40 % and recall of up to 100 %.
Surprisingly, the precision for a direct connection is slightly
higher for a 1 MB block than for a 2 MB block. However, the
validation time seems to be a good indicator for the number of
hops, since the precision for distances two and three are above
50 % Moreover, the larger the block sizes, the higher are the
estimated processing times. Hence, the lower is the share of
the estimated latency, which makes the model less dependent
on accurate latency estimations.
C. Real-World Experiments
In the real-world evaluation scenario, we deployed two
nodes in the peer-to-peer network over the course of one week.
One node functioned as the measurement node and recorded
the arrival time of all block inventory messages. Moreover, as
TABLE I: Real-world measurement results.
Model of [7] Test net. Main net.
kµ 0.38µs/B 8.55µs/B 12.74µs/B
kσ2 0.55µs
2/B 345.1µs2/B 2128.16µs2/B
True Positive 18 30 33
False Positive 18 26 33
False Negative 22 10 7
Precision 50 % 53.5 % 50 %
Recall 45 % 75 % 82.5 %
a point of reference, the relay node recorded its connections
over the time of measurement.
Afterwards, we apply our model to infer if a direct connec-
tion between the different block creators and the relay node
existed in the given time frame. We calculated RTT estimations
using the EWMA approach.
In the measurement period, we estimate the network size to
be 316 nodes of which 87 nodes sent at least five blocks.
Overall, we recorded 4,160 blocks with an average block
size of 15, 678B and 21 stale blocks. We also recorded
the average validation times our client exhibited during the
verification of 5,000 blocks from the Zcash main network.
Resulting from this, we set the estimated validation constants
to kµ = 12.7357µs/B and kσ2 = 2128.16µs2/B.
For the further evaluation, we only consider direct connec-
tions with the (mining) nodes that announced at least five
blocks.
As shown in TABLE I, even despite the low block sizes,
our model is able to achieve a precision of 50 % and a recall
of 82.5 % under the discussed parametrization.
D. Discussion
This real-world evaluation scenario shows that we can
consider half of the inferred connections as correct and only
a small amount of direct connections as missing. The results
support the general validity of our inference model. Consid-
ering the deliberate simplifying assumptions, the approach
seems to be a promising step for inferring the topology
of many cryptocurrencies similar to Bitcoin. Furthermore,
countermeasures for our method—e.g., artificially delaying
block relays—would increase the probability of stale blocks,
which weakens the system. It therefore becomes clear that our
method will remain usable in the future.
However, it should be possible to improve the precision
of the current model by acquiring more diversified latency
measurements and considering additional information about
the client location, like the AS number. For higher block sizes,
a better modeling of the validation time and the transmission
delay could also improve the results.
Furthermore, the calculation of the probability of a certain
amount of edges between nodes (P (H = h)) is calculated
based on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, which is a random topology.
However, it is unlikely that nodes are connected randomly in
a peer-to-peer network in which certain nodes have a higher
uptime than others. It is more likely that some central nodes
have more than 16 connections, especially nodes of the core
network. We leave these ideas open for future research.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented the first longitudinal measure-
ment study of the Zcash peer-to-peer network, revealing key
characteristics of the Zcash network. Moreover, we introduced
a topology inference model that relies on a passive timing
analysis of measured block arrival times. Our evaluation shows
that this model allows us to infer node interconnections with a
precision of 50 % and recall of 82 % in the real-world scenario.
We deem this an attractive approach for passive topology
inference of cryptocurrency networks.
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